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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

WILLIAM D. TYREE,

;

Case No. 20000011-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (1996). The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah sentenced Appellant/Defendant William Tyree ("Appellant"
or "Tyree") and entered Judgment of Conviction for Absconding, a third degree felony,
on November 24, 1999. A copy of the Judgment is in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue. Whether Tyree's sentence must be vacated where the trial court failed to
sentence him within the statutory maximum limit of forty-five days set forth in Utah R.
Crim. P. 22(a)?
Standard of Review. The interpretation of a statute involves a question of law
which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, ^[10, 975 P.2d 489.

Preservation. This issue was preserved below by written motion (R. 32-34, 44-49)
and hearing held on November 24, 1999. R. 65:8-18.
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULE
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) provides:
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall not be less than two
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 10, 1999, Appellant pled guilty to absconding, a third degree felony,
before the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn (R. 13-14). The case was bound over to Judge
Wilkinson for sentencing, and a sentencing hearing was scheduled for September 17,
1999 (R. 76:7). On September 14, 1999, the trial court continued sentencing on its own
motion (R. 23). On October 29, 1999, the court again continued sentencing on its own
motion (R. 28).
On November 2, 1999, Appellant filed an "Objection to the Imposition of
Sentence" (R. 32). On November 12, 1999, Appellant appeared for sentencing and
presented argument on his objection (R. 65:2-4). The state requested a continuance so
that it could respond in writing (R. 65:4). On November 19, 1999, the trial judge again
continued sentencing at the request of the state (R. 65:6).
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On November 24, 1999, defense counsel again presented his argument that the
forty-five day limit of Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) is jurisdictional and that since Appellant
had not waived the time for sentencing, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to
sentence him (R. 65:10). The trial judge denied the motion, and proceeded to sentence
Appellant to serve zero to five years at the Utah State Prison (R. 65:17-18). This appeals
follows.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The underlying facts are not relevant to the issue raised in this appeal, and have not
been adjudicated since Tyree pled guilty to absconding. In the plea affidavit, Tyree
acknowledged that he willfully changed his residence without informing his parole officer
(R. 16).
The facts relevant to the issue raised on appeal are as follows:
Tyree pleaded guilty to absconding before Judge Quinn on August 10, 1999
(R. 13-4). During the plea colloquy, Appellant requested that a pre-sentence report be
prepared prior to sentencing (R. 76:6). Judge Quinn ordered that a pre-sentence report be
prepared by the federal probation office, or by a probation office outside Salt Lake
County, and bound Tyree over for sentencing before Judge Wilkinson on September 17,
1999, within the forty-five day limit of Utah R. Crim. P 22(a) (R. 76:7, 13). Judge Quinn
did not ask Tyree to waive the forty-five day limit, and Tyree did not waive that
maximum time limit for sentencing (R. 76).
3

On September 14, 1999, Judge Wilkinson continued sentencing on his own motion
because a pre-sentence report was not available (R. 23-4). The record contains an
original and copy of a Pre-sentence/Referral form, dated September 14, 1999, requesting
that a pre-sentence investigation be prepared by the state Department of Corrections
within thirty days (R. 25-6). That form indicates that the request for a pre-sentence report
is a f,re-referrar and that sentencing is to be held on October 29, 1999 (R. 25-6). No
other referral form is located in the record.
On October 29, 1999, the trial court again made its own motion to continue
sentencing (R. 28). The reason for this second continuance of sentencing was that
Appellant, who was being held at the prison, had not been transported (R. 28).
On November 2, 1999, after the trial court continued sentencing on its own motion
for a second time, Appellant filed an "Objection to the Imposition of Sentence" and
accompanying memorandum (R. 32). On November 12, 1999, Appellant appeared for
sentencing and presented argument on his motion (R. 65:2-4). The state was not prepared
to proceed on the motion, and asked, after defense counsel had presented argument, for
the opportunity to respond in writing to the motion (R. 65:4). While the minute entry for
November 12, 1999 states that defense counsel moved for a continuance, a review of the
transcript of the hearing held that day shows that the state actually requested the
continuance so that it would have an opportunity to respond in writing (R. 30; 65:4).
On November 19, 1999, the trial judge again continued sentencing. The reason for
4

the continuance was that the prosecutor who was in the courtroom did not know anything
about the case (R. 65:6). Again, the minute entry incorrectly states that defense counsel
requested the continuance (R. 40). In reality, the prosecutor ask for the continuance,
stating, "I'd move for a continuance until Mr. Castle comes" (R. 65:6).
On November 24, 1999, defense counsel again presented his argument that the
forty-five day limit of Utah R. Crim. P. 22 (a) is jurisdictional and since Appellant did not
waive the maximum time for sentencing, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to
sentence him (R. 65:10). The trial judge denied the motion (R. 65:17-18).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) establishes a mandatory jurisdictional bar that precludes a
trial court from sentencing a defendant more than forty-five days after verdict or plea
unless the defendant has consented to the extension of time for sentencing. Rule 22(a) is
distinguishable from former Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-1 (1953) in that Rule 22(a) sets a
significantly longer period of time for sentencing. In addition, Rule 22(a) took care of
one of the concerns addressed in cases interpreting former Section 77-35-1 by allowing
the time to be extended with the consent of the defendant. While the rule could have used
directory language such as "may" or "should," it instead used mandatory language, "shall"
in place of "must" found in former 77-35-1. This further signifies that the rule is
jurisdictional and that cases interpreting the former statute do not control. Moreover,
holding that the rule is jurisdictional is consistent with this Court's decision in
5

State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992), holding the thirty day limit on motions to
withdraw guilty pleas is jurisdictional.
Even if the rule does not create a jurisdictional bar, the sentence should be vacated
because the three and one-half month delay in sentencing imposed a hardship on
Appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT LOST JURISDICTION TO SENTENCE
APPELLANT ON THIS THIRD DEGREE FELONY WHEN IT
CONTINUED SENTENCING BEYOND THE MAXIMUM FORTY-FIVE
DAY LIMIT.
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) mandates that criminal defendants be sentenced within
forty-five days of verdict or plea unless the maximum time for sentencing is waived.
Rule 22(a) states:
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall not be less than two
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis added).
When interpreting a rule, this Court Manalyze[s] the rule's ' " ' "plain language and
resort[s] to other methods . . . only if the language is ambiguous." ' " ' " Scott v. Majors,
1999 UT App 139, %99 980 P.2d 214 (further quotations omitted). The plain language of
Rule 22(a), mandating that sentencing shall be held within forty-five days of the plea, and
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further emphasizing that sentencing shall be held within that time frame unless the
defendant agrees otherwise, demonstrates that the time limit of the rule establishes a
mandatory limit on the trial court's ability to sentence an individual.
While the term "shall" has on occasion been interpreted as directory, "it is usually
presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as such previously in this and other
jurisdictions." Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County. 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983)
(citations omitted). "This Court assumes that the terms of a statute are used advisedly and
should be given an interpretation and application which is in accord with their usually
accepted meanings." IdL Interpreting the word "shall" to have its usual and ordinary
meaning that the action is mandatory furthers the purpose of Rule 22(a), which is to
ensure that a defendant is sentenced within a reasonable amount of time after pleading
guilty or being convicted of a crime. Making the time limit mandatory ensures that the
Legislature's mandate that sentencing occur within forty-five days of plea or verdict is
upheld.
Former Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-1 (1953 as amended) required, "the court must
appoint a time for pronouncing judgment, which must be at least two days and not more
than ten days after the verdict." Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-1 (1953 as amended). In State
v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held that former section
77-35-1 was not mandatory and did not create a jurisdictional bar to sentencing a
defendant when sentencing occurred more than ten days after a verdict. IdL at 797. The
7

Court reasoned that such an interpretation (1) served the statute's purpose in ensuring that
there not be an unreasonable delay in pronouncement of sentence, and that such a delay
not impose hardship on or prejudice the defendant, and (2) the statute did not otherwise
allow for sentencing to be continued at the request of or with the consent of the
defendant. Id.: see also Kelbach v. McCotter. 872 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Utah 1994) (former
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-1 (1953) is not jurisdictional); State v. Fedden 262 P.2d 753,
754-55 (Utah 1953) (same); Rose v. District Court. 248 P. 486, 488 (Utah 1926) (where
defendant does not object to imposition of sentence, court will not vacate sentence which
is imposed beyond statutory maximum).
Helm and the other cases holding that former section 77-35-1 was "merely
directory" and did not create a jurisdictional bar to sentencing more than ten days after
verdict do not control the issue in this case because: (1) the holdings relate to a former
statute, not the current rule; (2) the current rule differs from the former statute in that it
creates a significantly longer period for sentencing-forty-five days as opposed to ten
days—thereby allotting trial courts an abundant amount of time in which to meet the
mandates of the rule; and (3) in adopting the current rule, the Supreme Court remedied
the second concern outlined in Helm, 563 P.2d at 797, by explicitly allowing the period to
be extended at the request or with the consent of the defendant.
By adopting a rule which explicitly allows a defendant to consent to extend the
period, the Supreme Court removed the Helm Court's rationale for holding that the
8

former statute was not jurisdictional. In addition, rather than indicating that the statute
was directory by using the word "may" or "should," the Supreme Court extended
significantly the period for sentencing and substituted the word "shall" for "must" when it
adopted Rule 22(a). Given that we must presume the deliberateness of the word choice
and given further the common meaning of the term "shall," it appears that the Supreme
Court intended to make it easier for trial courts to comply with the rule by lengthening the
period while also mandating that if the longer time limits are not met, there is a
jurisdictional bar to sentencing.
Requiring trial judges to sentence within forty-five days unless the defendant
agrees otherwise presents a significantly different situation than requiring judges to
sentence within ten days of verdict or plea. First, the period is sufficiently lengthy that it
allows judges many options for the time of sentencing; this means that judges are much
less likely to violate the mandates of the rule. Second, if judges delay sentencing beyond
the forty-five days, as occurred in this case, defendants can be prejudiced either because
they are required to serve more time in jail before ultimately being transferred to the
prison, or because an appearance before the Board of Pardons and determination of the
specific amount of time to be served is delayed. A delay in sentencing when a defendant
is ultimately sentenced to prison means that a defendant's acclimatization to the prison,
his access to programs and education, and the time attributed by the Board to the amount
of time served at the prison may all be delayed. While this may not make much
9

difference when ten days are involved, it does make a difference when a defendant is held
in jail for more than forty-five days.
Concluding that the current rule is jurisdictional would be consistent with this
Court's decision in State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992). In Price, this Court
held that Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) is jurisdictional and requires that a criminal
defendant must make a motion to withdraw a guilty plea within thirty days of the plea
hearing. Id. at 582. This Court reasoned in Price that the language of Section 77-136(2)(b) was similar to that of Rules 4 and 48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
both of which are jurisdictional. Id at 582. Because the language of Utah R. Crim. P.
22(a) is similar to that of Section 77-13-6(2)(b) as well as Utah R. App. P. 4 and 48, this
Court should interpret the rule consistently with its decisions in these other areas and hold
that the forty-five day limit creates a jurisdictional bar to sentencing more than forty-five
days after the plea or verdict unless the defendant consents to the extension. In this case
where Tyree did not consent to the extension, such a jurisdictional bar requires that his
sentence be vacated and the case closed.
Alternatively, even if Rule 22(a) does not create a jurisdictional bar, Tyree's
sentence must be vacated under the circumstances of this case where the delay resulted in
the imposition of hardship and prejudice on defendant. See Helm, 593 P.2d at 797. Tyree
pleaded guilty to a third degree felony on August 10, 1999 (R. 15-22). The possible
sentence for this crime was zero to five years. On its own motion, the trial court
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continued sentencing twice to November 12, 1999, more than ninety days after Tyree's
plea. The trial judge ultimately sentenced Tyree on November 24, 1999, three and a half
months after his plea.1 Although Tyree was being held at the prison, on a probation
violation, the delay in sentencing postponed the date at which he would appear before the
Board to determine the actual time he would serve. Given the short length of the
potential sentence, this delay imposed a hardship which requires that the sentence be
vacated.
In this case, the trial judge did not have jurisdiction to sentence Appellant more
than forty-five days after he pleaded guilty. In addition, even if the forty-five day limit is
not jurisdictional, the delay in sentencing imposed a hardship on Appellant, requiring that
the sentence be vacated.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant William Tyree respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
sentence.
SUBMITTED this SJUL day of May, 2000.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

1

The prosecutor requested two additional brief extensions to enable the state to respond
to Appellant's motion to dismiss (R. 65:4, 6).
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2
^ ^ g F ^ R E Y ^ W . HALL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered the original
and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th
Floor, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah
Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O.
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this S'-tL day of May, 2000.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's
Office as indicated above this

day of May, 2000.
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ADDENDUM

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 991906509 FS

WILLIAM D TYREE,
Defendant,

Judge:
Date:

HOMER F. WILKINSON
November 24] 1999

PRESENT
Clerk:
deborahw
Prosecutor: WISSLER, SIRENA M.
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s); HALL, JEFFREY W.
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: October 24, 1967
Video
Tape Count: 9:00
CHARGES
2. ABSCONDING - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/1999 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ABSCONDING a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Page 1

Case No:

Date:

991906509

Nov 24, 1999

SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
This sentence is to run concurrent with the sentencing term he is
currently serving_
Defendant is responsible for full restitution in this matter.
Court .denies Defendant's motion.

Page 2 (last)

